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The history of the federal lands has been marked by recurring debates over 
the nature of the land tenure system in the West. The fundamental and 
enduring nature of these debates has been quite apparent recently, for 
serious attention has been paid to the following specific proposals. Should 
the ownership of the public lands be transferred to the states in which they 
are located? Should large portions of the federal lands be sold off to the 
private sector? Should the states be permitted to undertake major programs 
of land exchange and consolidation with the federal government, to create 
contiguous landholdings for both the states and the federal government? 
Should the Reagan administration be allowed to implement a major ad­
ministrative land management proposal that systematically exchanges land 
management responsibilities between the Interior and Agriculture depart­
ments throughout the federal domain? 1
Such a large number of fundamental challenges in a relatively short time 
clearly suggests serious dissatisfaction with either or both the existing land 
tenure system and the existing land management system. There appears 
to be a continuing problem in the legitimacy of public lands institutions. 
Dissatisfaction with public lands institutions, I argue here, grows out of 
the intersection of two critical controversies. First, what values should 
govern resource use on the public lands? Second, what should be the role
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of subnational governments in contributing to policy-making and policy 
implementation on the federal domain?
This chapter explores the relationships between these contending re­
source use values and the question of subnational political representation 
in understanding existing conflicts and the implications for the existing 
public lands system of policy-making. Specifically, three questions are ad­
dressed. The first is the extent to which many public lands issues are largely 
based in conflicts over resource values. The second is the extent to which 
a devolution of public land resource use decision making to subnational 
governments, notably the western states, would result in significant shifts 
in resource use policies in the direction of harder uses. The third issue is 
an assessment of the political values of the existing institutional structure 
that governs the federal domain.
RESOURCE USE VALUES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS CONFLICTS
Much of the ongoing debate over appropriate resource uses for the public 
lands is expressed in economic terms. Obviously assessments of economic 
efficiency are appropriate in conducting policy analyses of public lands 
management. Such analyses often appear, however, to reflect deeply held 
preferences about what values should govern the public lands, preferences 
independent of economic efficiency. It is impressive to realize that critques 
of existing public land managerial policies stress the economic inefficiency 
of existing federal land management policies, regardless of the perspective 
in which they originate.
Analysts associated with such organizations as the Sierra Club or the 
Wilderness Society, for example, are able with relative ease to question 
the justification of federal subsidies to the perpetually marginal livestock 
and logging industries operating on lands managed by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) and the Forest Service. Critics of the existing structure 
of grazing fees on the public lands point out that the federal government 
recoups approximately 140 per acre in fees but spends approximately 40c' 
an acre in administering lands. Environmentalists are convinced that this 
shortfall has little to do with the quality of federal land leased for grazing 
or the quality of BLM services provided the ranchers. They attribute the 
shortfall instead to the political resourcefulness of public lands ranchers 
and their representatives in Washington, D.C. A  timely illustration of such 
political resourcefulness on the part of the public lands ranchers is found 
in the perennial grazing fee controversy. The federal government is re­
quired by statute to charge fair market value for grazing rights. This re­
quirement is regularly waived. In the search for additional revenue during 
the budgetary deficits of the mid-1980s, the Office of Management and 
Budget has sought to increase grazing fees. Such fee increases have been 
vigorously resisted by grazing associations and western congressional del­
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egations. In December 1985, 28 western senators, eighteen of whom voted 
for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction bill, wrote President 
Reagan asking him not to disturb the existing grazing fee structure.2
Free-market advocates regularly point out the federal government’s ap­
parent inability to capture much of the rental income from fossil fuels and 
hard rock mining on the public lands, no matter what changes are intro­
duced in federal leasing policy. The President’s Commission on Fair Market 
Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing is a useful catalog of the challenges 
to devising a policy to improve the government’s income from the western 
lands’ subsurface wealth.3 It seems reasonable to infer from the existing 
literature that the public lands might generate greater revenues than they 
do today if they were managed under more stringent criteria, including 
eliminating subsidized marginal operations and permitting greater freedom 
for the deployment of development capital on the federal estate.
Explanations for the failure to realize greater income from the federal 
estate span a wide range. Some believe that the public sector is not capable 
of efficient economic management since it lacks the discipline of the mar­
ketplace. Others argue that the contemporary federal government is seem­
ingly incapable of establishing a federal mission on the public lands in the 
sense of formulating and implementing federal objectives. These critics 
regard federal policy on the public lands as the result of competition among 
interest groups that are powerfully influential in the making and admin­
istering of federal natural resources policy, as in most other areas of federal 
policy-making.
It is unlikely that economic efficiency is the principal goal in the contin­
uing debate over the future of the public lands. Rather, in my judgment, 
the controversy is the underlying issue of appropriate resource use. For 
example, if the fundamental concern about cattle grazing on the public 
lands is the preservation of the existing landscape and the judgment is 
made that grazing on the arid lands is damaging to the ecology, then raising 
the grazing fees should reduce the number of marginal operators on the 
public lands. The question from the point of view of some environmen­
talists, therefore, is not how much income the government is losing but 
what a particular use is apparently doing to the lands.
The creation of wilderness areas is another example of conflict over 
values masquerading in economic guise. Wilderness areas have generated 
substantial controversies throughout the West. Critics of expanding wil­
derness areas have argued passionately that setting aside such lands could 
threaten the mining of strategic minerals judged to be critical to the national 
interest. It is likely, however, that the intensity of the controversy over 
the wilderness issue has less to do with the availability of minerals, given 
the relative size and probable distribution of mineral deposits, than with 
the questions about the basic value of setting aside large tracts of land for 
absolute minimal use. The idea of wilderness set-asides on the scale realized
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or proposed in many states is judged wrong by those who believe that 
resources should be utilized to fuel the nation’s economy.
In many respects, the conflicts over the management and ownership of 
the public lands are cultural. Douglas and Wildavsky suggest that much of 
the conflict over environmental issues, specifically questions involving as­
sessments of environmental risk, are based less in disagreements over inter­
pretations of scientific data than in fundamental debates over the very 
conception of society itself.4 In other words, those broadly in agreement 
with fundamental social values that place a premium on economic growth 
are more likely to discount risks that may be associated with certain forms 
of resource development. In contrast, as Douglas and Wildavsky describe 
it, those at the border rather than at the center of society are inclined to 
consider as a serious threat what society appears to promote as an ac­
ceptable risk.
This center-periphery conception of cultural conflict is resonant in some 
of the recent controversies over land tenure issues on the public lands. 
This Land Is Your Land, a recent work by Bernard Shanks published by 
the Sierra Club, calls eloquently for maintaining the western lands as fed­
eral lands: “The American landscape has never been at one with the white 
culture that has changed the land’s spirit and character everywhere but the 
places left as the public domain. Our manifesto must maintain a public 
domain haunted with a great past, a land intact and sustaining.” 5 This 
argument for retention is clearly a cultural argument that assigns funda­
mental important to the role of undisturbed nature in the life of the nation. 
Shanks’s book is not atypical, nor is it to be dismissed as romance.
A  quite different perspective regards the federal domain as having been 
treated as little more than a common pool, overused and exploited. Baden 
and Lueck have sharply criticized federal ownership and federal managers:
The BLM’s record of inefficiency closely parallels that of the Forest Service and for 
essentially the same reasons. Management by bureaucrats who lack residual claimancy 
and who are subjected to intense political pressure has led to inefficient resource allocation 
and often significant environmental degradation. The rationale of continued public own­
ership and management of land assets rests on extremely shaky ground.6
These two illustrations suggest more than a debate over competing strat­
egies to realize the same objectives. Rather, they are cultural orientations 
to the meaning of property ownership in society itself. In Shanks’s view, 
the federal domain must remain apart from the marketplace, for it is a 
repository of pre-European values. For Baden and Lueck, the transfer of 
the western lands to the marketplace promotes efficient and varied uses 
by eliminating politics. In effect, the marketplace itself becomes something 
more than a means— a desired cultural value in and of itself.
There is an argument for distinguishing between competing paradigms
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in the attitudes of various elite and other groups toward nature. Lester 
Milbrath describes on the one hand the old dominant social paradigm 
associated with the values of industrialism, productivity, and the belief 
structure that humans should dominate nature to suit their needs. In con­
trast is what Milbrath describes as the new environmental paradigm that 
stresses the human community as a part of nature.7 These two paradigms 
may be stated in a way that suggests the merits of the environmental 
perspective. Nonetheless, there appears to be a core meaning to contrasting 
perspectives articulated in the paradigms.
There are, of course, other persuasive cultural perspectives. In the tra­
dition of a literature drawn from culture in conflict, their proponents also 
write with skill and power about arguments for increased economic activity 
on the public lands. If we accept the argument that much of the debate 
over resource use on the public lands has less to do with economic efficiency 
and more to do with cultural differences, however, we can then consider 
the implications of the contending values argument for the other great 
federal domain question: the debate over the role of state and local gov­
ernments in public lands policy decision making.
SUBNATIONAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC LANDS DECISION MAKING
Long-time observers of public lands politics in the western states will 
point out that commodity user groups or groups associated with harder 
resource uses have sought state and local political responsibility for re­
source use decisions.* These harder use groups believe that subnational 
levels of government are likely to be more sympathetic to traditional user 
groups. In contrast, conservation groups and, later, environmentalist 
groups historically have supported the federal government as the appro­
priate forum to own and administer the public lands. These groups are 
concerned that subnational governments are often dominated by resource 
developers and/or lack the bureaucratic competence to manage the lands. 
There has been research to suggest that state legislatures may be more 
inclined to support the views of harder use advocates than would be re­
flected in the western states’ populations. In contrast, environmentalist 
organizations have viewed the federal government as open to different 
policy perspectives, with a tradition since the Progressive Era of a resource 
management civil service and the major advantage of a writ that extends 
throughout the federal domain rather than being confined to a single state.
Such are the historic perceptions of contending public lands user groups. 
These perceptions apparently underpinned the respective strategies of sup­
porters and opponents of the Sagebrush Rebellion effort to transfer sig­
nificant portions of the federal lands to the states in which they were 
located. The privatization movement has generated similar controversy
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about whether the transfer of public lands on a large scale to the private 
sector would result in a changing set of uses.
Large-scale privatization of the federal lands might result in transfer of 
land use regulation from federal to state governments, depending on the 
conditions governing land transfers. Joseph Sax has suggested that the 
question of use is not really related to the question of landownership.9 
Whether lands remain in federal, state, or private hands is beside the point 
that under existing law, the capacity exists for state and local political 
institutions to determine many major use and maintenance questions. If, 
as Sax argues, landownership is not necessarily determinative of resource 
use, then the issue is either one of symbolism or the political question of 
the appropriate sets of regulations and regulators. '
It is therefore of considerable interest to assess the consequences for 
public lands policy outcomes if the western states were given a larger role 
in public lands decision making and states were moved from the role of 
actors in the decision-making process to the forum where policy decisions 
are made. In assessing the likely nature of the western states’ policy-mak­
ing, Hirschman’s model of exit, voice, and loyalty is useful.10 Briefly, this 
well-known work argues that if it is relatively easier for individuals to leave 
an organization and realize their preferences than to seek their goals from 
within, they will exit. If, on the other hand, it is relatively hard to exit 
because few realistic alternatives exist, individuals are likely to seek to 
exert voice and to work within the organization to achieve their stated 
aims. The parallel I wish to draw with the public lands states is that over 
most of this century, conservationists and, later, environmentalists have 
found it easier to leave the western states and seek influence at the federal 
level. The federal alternative has been consistently a more appealing option 
to environmentalists than seeking voice within the political context of the 
western states. The basic appeal of this national strategy was undoubtedly 
enhanced by the greater resources available at the national level than in 
the relatively less-well-off western states. There is evidence to support two 
contentions about the likely effects of devolution of power over the public 
lands to the western states. First, sufficient range of opinion within the 
western states has found political expression to support an interpretation 
that westerners are by no means monolithic on resource use on the western 
lands. Second, when attention to the environmentalist perspective in the 
federal capital declined with the advent of the Reagan administration in 
1981, there was a corresponding rise in organized environmentalist interest 
group activity in the Mountain and Pacific states. The apparent shift in the 
federal agenda took place in the context of rising interest in devolving 
power and recognition to the states in resource use decision making that 
had emerged in the 1970s and was consonant with the rhetoric of the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s.
In the examination that follows of the distribution of preferences on
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natural resource and environmental regulation, it is important to distinguish 
the Pacific Coast and the Intermountain states. Surveys of popular attitudes 
on resources issues that embrace the entire western region are inevitably 
dominated by the massive California population. Separating the Mountain 
states from the Pacific Coast states is justified on the basis of longstanding 
differences in economic development and cultural traditions. At the same 
time, the two sets of states share in the western tradition of vast tracts of 
wilderness and large-scalc federal ownership of the public lands.
Since the mid-1960s, there has been much confusion over the extent or 
absence of environmentalist sentiment in the western states. Studies that 
suggest substantial support for what might be described as softer uses have 
often relied on surveys that combine both the Mountain states and the 
West Coast. Efforts to separate the Mountain states from the West Coast 
reveal sharp differences over resource use development in the Mountain 
states that are much less apparent in the coastal states.
A survey of issues that are important in political campaigns suggests that 
significant attention is paid to issues of resource development in the In­
termountain region. Conflicts between hard and soft development strate­
gies became increasingly apparent in state politics throughout the 1970s 
and the 1980s. For example, such controversies have characterized Mon­
tana politics for a number of years in the debate over whether to emphasize 
mineral and fossil fuel development or recreational development. 11 Col­
orado politics have seen sharp debates over the development of the Western 
Slope. 12 Although less dramatic, similar debates arc clearly apparent in 
the other Mountain states. Surveys of state legislative voting patterns con­
ducted by state environmental organizations in Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, 
and Colorado reveal that a pattern common to all four states is the im­
portance of party affiliation in predicting legislators' votes on selected 
natural resource and environmental regulatory bills.13 In 1981 on a 100- 
point index of legislative agreement with the specific agendas of respective 
state environmental organizations, Idaho Republicans averaged 45.3 per­
cent while Idaho Democrats averaged 70.7 percent. The parallel partisan 
contrast is apparent in Wyoming, where in the same year Republican 
legislators averaged 20.5 percent and Democrats 78.3 percent. The pattern 
is repeated in Colorado, where Democratic legislators averaged 78.3 per­
cent and Republicans averaged 15.4 percent. Finally in Wyoming, the state 
environmental organization scored Democratic legislators at 76.5 percent 
and Republican legislators at 29.4 percent.
It is apparent that there is a distinctive partisan dimension to environ­
mental and natural resource issues in the Mountain states. It is, of course, 
not surprising to recognize that party elites divide on natural resource 
questions. Studies over the past fifteen years would suggest the existence 
of such partisan divisions. 14 Less expected, however, is the dramatic nature 
of partisan divisions in the Mountain states, where Democratic and Re-
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Table 3
Should the Government Relax Environmental Regulations, in Order to Increase 
Energy Sources? Responses by Region
Keep Regulations Relax Relax Regulations
Unchanged Regulations with Qualifications
Northeast 57.4% 32.3% 10.3%
(151) (85) . (27)
Central 52.5% 31.9% 15.6%
(168) (102) (50)
South 47.2% 38.3% 14.6% -
(191) (155) (59)
Mountain 44.4% 41.3% 14.3%
(28) (26) (9>
Pacific 65.4% 19 9% 14.7%
(102) • (31) (23)
Data source: 1980 National Election Survey, Center for Political Studies, Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan
publican legislators are sharply divided on a number of environmental and 
natural resource use questions. In contrast, an analysis of the California 
state legislature in 1981 by a state environmental organization revealed 
differences between Democratic and Republican legislators but by no 
means to the same extent as in the Mountain states. Democrats averaged
69.5 percent and Republicans 51.8 percent, respectively.
The partisan divisions reflected at the elite levels in the Mountain states 
are apparent at the mass level as well. Surveys conducted by the Survey 
Research Center at the University of Michigan on questions of levels of 
support for existing environmental regulations indicated in 1980 that the 
Mountain states were one of the regions in the nation most willing to relax 
environmental regulations (Table 3). Approximately 44 percent of resi­
dents in the Mountain states wished to keep regulations unchanged. In 
contrast, residents in the Pacific states favored keeping the existing set of 
regulations by 65.4 percent, a sentiment echoed by the residents of the 
Northeast by 57.4 percent. When responses to the environmental regula­
tory questions are broken down by partisan identification, an instructive 
contrast is evident between the responses in the West Coast and the Moun­
tain states. In the coastal states, over 73 percent of Democrats favored 
leaving environmental regulations unchanged. That percentage dropped
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to about 51 percent for coastal Republican identifiers. In contrast, Moun­
tain states’ Democratic identifiers by about 68 percent supported leaving 
environmental regulations unchanged, but the level of support for existing 
regulations among Republican identifiers fell to 14 percent. This sharp 
partisan division on environmental questions would suggest that in this 
Republican age so apparent in the western United States, there would be 
relatively little support for environmentalist positions. But there is a good 
deal of evidence to suggest that natural resource politics are quite lively 
and by no means a forgone conclusion in the Mountain states.
A  decline in communication between environmentalist organizations and 
federal decision makers, in conjunction with a perceived increase in im­
portance of the states in resource use decision making, has generated 
increased political activity at the subnational level among western envi­
ronmentalists. An illustration of the rise of subnational environmentalist 
organizations in the West is that from 1980-1983, the Sierra Club’s mem­
bership grew by 266 percent within the seven Mountain states of Idaho, 
Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. Nationally 
the Sierra Club increased its membership by 190 percent.15 During that 
three-year period, the Intermountain region grew from 4.5 percent to 6.4 
percent of the total national Sierra Club membership. Approximately 5 
percent of the U.S. population lives in the seven Mountain states, which 
suggests that in recent years at least, the Sierra Club has moved from a 
position of below what the region “should” contribute to above what the 
region can proportionately “offer.” This rise in Sierra Club membership 
in the Mountain region was one of the fastest rates of growth in the nation 
and conveys some sense that there is a local environmentalist force likely 
to grow if increased resource use decision making is devolved to the states. 
One pattern in club membership does not necessarily reflect a regional 
trend, but there is additional evidence that serious debate over environ­
mental and natural resource issues is indigenous to a number of the Moun­
tain states.
The sharp distinctions apparent in environmental organizations’ assess­
ments of legislators are reflected in the survey results of area residents in 
the Mountain states. Partisan identification is a powerful predictor of at­
titudes on resource use questions. The importance of political party in the 
western Mountain states is apparently more important than it is in other 
regions of the nation. A  reasonable explanation for the intensity of the 
partisan nature of the natural resources debate may be the central nature 
of natural resource issues in many of the western states’ economies and 
indeed in the cultural life of many western communities.
There are two implications of these survey findings on elite and popular 
partisan divisions on resource regulation for this discussion of devolving 
public land use decision making to the state level. The first is that devolution 
of increased powers to the states would certainly increase the stakes, but
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by no means reduce the intensity, of the debate taking place in these states. 
The second is the presence in many of these states of strong, successful 
Republican parties. Local Republican parties are apparently committed to 
increased levels of resource use. It might therefore be concluded that a 
devolution of resource use decision making to the states would result in 
so-called harder resource uses given the political success enjoyed by west­
ern Republicans.
The prospect is hypothetical, however. In the context of an actual trans­
fer of power to the western states, it might be hard to anticipate the shape 
of party outcomes on resource use issues. It is likely, for example, that 
environmentalist organizations in western states would redouble their ef­
forts at the state level in order to increase their voice in state policy-making 
if increased resource use decision making were given to the states. In­
creasingly environmentalist forces would seek voice in policy-making at 
the state level in an atmosphere of sophisticated state politics.
The importance and the limitation of partisan politics in understanding 
natural resource use decision making in the Mountain states is reflected in 
the experience of the Reagan administration during the 1980s. The advent 
of the Reagan administration in 1981 may have significantly reduced the 
level of political tension between a number of the public lands states and 
the federal administration because congressional delegations and the White 
House shared the same party membership. Clearly some of the antagonism 
that had characterized relations between the western states and the Carter 
administration—ranging from the water projects hit list in 1977 to the MX 
basing decision in 1979-1980— diminished with the Reagan administration. 
But party alliance between Washington and the West was by no means 
sufficient to stave off serious political challenges from the West to the 
Reagan administration during the privatization initiative in 1981. Western 
state Republican leaderships had quite serious reservations about the pri­
vatization initiative and were quick to express their discontent publicly. It 
is clear that the public lands states are lively forums for resource use debates 
and that such debates are more central to their political concerns than is 
the case in other parts of the country. It is reasonable and prudent for 
federal decision makers to address how western state representatives are 
to be incorporated in public lands policy-making in order to avoid some 
of the conflicts that have characterized policy initiatives over the last two 
administrations.
There is some basis for formal consultation between the federal govern­
ment and state governments on a large number of resource use questions. 
It is evident from many analyses of federal legislation enacted during the 
1970s that the role of the states in helping to shape resource use decision 
making on the public lands was recognized and encouraged. There is little 
doubt that the states are more likely to be influential if their respective 
statutes propose some sets of land use regulations. States apparently have
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the capacity to resist federal land uses if they find such uses inimical to 
higher state standards of environmental regulation. This capacity does not 
apparently extend to promoting so-called harder uses on the lands, nor 
does it challenge the fundamental authority of the federal government over 
the federal domain. 16 This expanded role for the states raises the question 
of the extent to which federal policy objectives are served by existing public 
lands institutions. In the view of some commentators, the management of 
the public lands is illustrative of the worst sort of federal policy-making: 
no more than internecine conflict among diverse interest groups and various 
layers of government.
REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS INSTITUTIONS
The characterization of interest group liberalism so often leveled at pub­
lic lands management must be evaluated against the background that a 
diverse set of concerns and uses are recognized as appropriate for the 
public lands. These uses often arise from quite different cultural perspec­
tives. Coming to terms with managing the public lands is a complicated 
question. There is the fundamental problem of what range of values to 
incorporate into management of the public domain and the structural ques­
tion of how a set of institutions should be designed not only to incorporate 
this set of recognized interests but to be cognizant as well of the interests 
of subnational governments.
It may be correct that a significant proportion of the policies operating 
on public domain expenditures results from bargaining among powerful 
interest groups rather than a realization of national purpose. A persuasive 
case can be made for the proposition that a serious problem with public 
lands institutions is the underdeveloped role of the federal government in 
the exercise of its managerial responsibilities. But the limitations of federal 
institutions do not necessarily imply that such institutions should be greatly 
strengthened.
Recognition of the inadequacies of federal policy, however, should not 
obscure the fact that a central need is an accommodation of the interests 
of those who use the land. These user groups have developed over time a 
sustained commitment to certain uses on the land. A policy that seeks to 
realize one set of interests at the expense of others is likely to exacerbate 
conflict on the public lands and to deny the concerns of interests now 
denied participation in the federal estate. Proposals for much greater re­
liance on the market to accommodate these diverse values or for the states 
alone to assume such decision-making responsibility need to be carefully 
evaluated in comparison to the existing set of public lands institutions. One 
of the more original American political theorists, John C. Calhoun, argued 
in his Disquisition on Government that it is difficult to equalize the actions 
of government and to avoid perversion of its powers to enrich some interests
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by exploiting others.17 His well-known recommendation was to provide 
each division of the community either a concurrent voice in law making 
or a veto on the execution of the law. Calhoun argued that such an ar­
rangement would not result in the failure to produce needed national 
decisions but would “unite the most opposite and conflicting interests” to 
devise compromises that help to build the political community.
The obverse of policy gridlock in the Calhounian conception of concur­
rent majorities is the risk of interest group liberalism. A major concern 
for Lowi is that there has been an abdication of legal responsibility by 
Congress in making public policy decisions and allocating resources. Con­
gress, in Lowi’s view, has granted far too much discretionary authority to 
agencies and departments. 18 Federal agencies operating with a broad man­
date are susceptible to the pressures of congressional committees and in­
terest groups. Observers writing in the Lowi tradition have concluded that 
many policy decisions simply reflect the shifting strengths of a collection 
of interest groups that possess access to Congress and the appropriate 
agencies. Robert Nelson has suggested that Lowi’s analysis is particularly 
appropriate for understanding public lands decision making. 19 His under­
standing of resource allocation on the public lands is bargaining among the 
diverse users that over the years has resulted in increasing federal subsidies. 
These subsidies are intended to reduce conflict on the federal estate among 
both traditional and nontraditional users of the lands and several levels of 
subnational government. Nelson’s criticism is that in this process there is 
no clear mission for the lands that reflect the public interest. Nelson believes 
that in the absence of a clearly delineated public mission, public lands 
management has become increasingly confused and increasingly econom­
ically inefficient.
A greater reliance on the views of voters or on public participation to 
overcome the distortions of interest group competition is dismissed by 
critics of interest group liberalism who argue that the role played by voters 
is often irresponsible. Dennis and Simmons have argued that “because the 
costs of public programs can be diffused and benefits concentrated, voters 
are able to exaggerate their wants by calling them needs.” 20 The recom­
mendation of such critics is that a transfer of the lands to the marketplace 
is the only solution that would permit the end to what are seen as failures 
of the existing system. But the problem may not be so easily resolved. A  
shift to the market requires careful development of rules governing prop­
erty. Every indication is that the range, diversity, and sophistication of 
public lands interests at both the national and subnational level are such 
that the development of an elegant market solution might prove legisla­
tively elusive.
Few would argue that federal policy-making should not be more than 
an exercise in barter among private groups or an appeal to voters who are 
not accountable for the costs of programs. As was observed during the
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1970s, however, efforts to produce comprehensive legislation to govern 
such important activities as strip mining and nuclear waste are problematic. 
These statutes reflect the reality that competing demands are now enacted 
into law rather than expressed as pressures on agency administration. The 
reality of public lands politics is that there are a number of interests deeply 
concerned about resource use. A  governing strategy that would impose a 
simple majoritarian statist solution to public lands management is unlikely 
to be realized. Moreover, it would be quite likely to generate increased 
controversy, particularly among organized and passionate interests not 
included in the policy-making process. Analysts such as Jack Walker and 
John Berry have pointed out that there has been a deconcentration of 
power and that a relatively small number of groups in conjunction with 
party leaderships no longer may achieve consensus on the policy agenda.21 
There are today simply a wider set of interests who are less willing to accept 
such leadership patterns. Determining and implementing a specific agenda 
has proved increasingly elusive in many public policy areas. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in public lands management.
The past twenty years have witnessed a growing number of interest 
groups involved in resource use questions and a corresponding diffusion 
in political sophistication among these diverse user groups. In an important 
dimension, the complex system of resource use management that has 
evolved on the public lands should be seen less as an exercise in interest 
group liberalism and more as a creation of a Calhounian system of con­
current majorities. It is a system based on the recognition that a number 
of fundamental interest groups should be part of the federal domain. These 
interests are, of course, recognized by federal statutes such as the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. Although such statutes invite 
consultation in decision making, they cannot be determinative of actual 
administrative practice. Statutory recognition of a diversity of interests on 
the public domain does not mean that the question is settled as to who is 
to represent such interests. Nor does the statute determine the relative 
weights in policy-making that are to be assigned to these diverse interests. 
Public lands policies and their implementation are the results of an awk­
ward, complicated system. Over time, the system has become institution­
alized. We should anticipate a lengthy policy-making process of negotiation 
and adjustment at the intersection of governmental level and interest group 
representation. The process will work as long as the necessity for negoti­
ation is recognized. But if decision makers seek to circumvent extended 
negotiations, the resultant policy is likely to exacerbate conflict and lead 
to oscillations in public lands policy that are surely less desirable for the 
public lands. In short, the problem of public lands management is devising 
a strategy that seeks reconciliation of often-conflicting value systems with 
representation from several levels of government.
The existing set of public lands institutions has evolved over the course
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of this century to the point of capacity to accommodate a growing and 
diverse range of values. Only 50 years ago, the principal uses on the public 
lands were grazing and some coal and oil production. In recent years, 
channels of formal participation have been opened up. There has been a 
remarkable growth in recreational use, as well as increasingly sophisticated 
mineral and fuel location and development. State and local governments 
historically exercised some power over public lands policy only indirectly 
through the influence of western congressional delegations. In the past two 
decades, through federal statutes and federal court decisions, there has 
been a formal recognition of the role of states in public lands questions. 
The western states themselves have grown in sophistication in statutes, 
personnel, and their respective abilities to contribute to public lands de­
cision making. Public lands institutions have had a sufficiently protean 
quality to accommodate the growth in uses and the growing strength of 
subnational governments.
It is, of course, highly probable that the conflicts on the public domain 
will continue, but the mere presence of conflict has never been the most 
interesting issue. The fundamental political question that remains is 
whether institutional arrangements can be designed to resolve these con­
flicts. There are two sets of rival institutional arrangements to the existing 
public lands institutions. One alternative is a transfer of decision making 
to the states either directly by giving ownership to the western states or 
indirectly by sale to the private sector, which in effect places such lands 
under western states’ regulation. The second is a strengthening of the 
mission of the federal government by augmenting its power to determine 
resource use decision making—that is, by seeking to free land management 
from interest group liberalism. The devolution of power to the states is 
unlikely to reduce conflict. Rather, the likelihood is that it will engender 
much more localized conflict throughout the communities of the states. 
Granting increased power to federal land agencies, a strategy of power 
concentration, seems to deny the Calhounian recognition that there are 
genuine and passionate lands interests that need to be taken into account 
in decision making. A review of the contemporary conflicts on public lands 
use questions suggests that the existing public lands institutions are more 
likely to be responsive to the nature of western lands conflicts by balancing 
federal and state interests and the range of resource use values than the 
alternatives that have been offered to date.
NOTES
1. See John G. Francis, “ Land Consolidation: A Third Alternative,” Policy Studies  
Journal 14 (December 1985), pp. 285-95.
2. T. R. Reid, “ Western Grazing Fees Slip Out of the Budget N oose,” W ashington  
P ost, February 2, 1986, p. A3. See Sabine Kremp, “ A Perspective on BLM Grazing
Public Lands Institutions 75
Policy,” in Bureaucracy vs. the Environment, ed. J. Baden and R. Stroup (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1981), pp. 124-53, for a critical evaluation of 
federal grazing policy.
3. Report of the Commission, F air M arket Value P olicy fo r  F ederal C oat Leasing 
(February 1984).
4. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, An Essay on the Selection  
o f  Technical and Environmental D angers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
5. Bernard Shanks, This Land Is Your Land: The Struggle to Save A m erica’s Public  
Lands (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1984), p. 298.
6. John Baden and Dean Lueck, “ Bringing Private Management to the Public Lands: 
Environmental and Economic Advantages,” in C ontroversies in Environmental P o licy , 
ed. S. Kamieniecki, R. O’Brien and M. Clarke (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New 
York Press, 1986), p. 54.
7. Lester W. Milbrath, Environmentalists; Vanguard fo r  a N ew  Society  (Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1984).
8. See Grant McConnell, “ The Conservation Movement— Past and Present,” W est­
ern Political Quarterly  7 (1954): 463-78, for an account of the conservation movement’s 
commitment to federal decision making up to the 1950s. See also J. G. Francis, “ En­
vironmental Values, Intergovernmental Politics and the Sagebrush Rebellion,” in Western 
Public Lands, ed. J. Francis and R. Ganzel (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 
1984), pp. 29-46 , for a discussion of environmentalist commitment to federal decision 
making during the 1980s.
9. Joseph L. Sax, “ The Claim for Retention of the Public Lands,” in Rethinking 
the Federal Lands, ed. Sterling Brubaker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1984), pp. 125-48.
10. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1970).
11. Lauren S. McKinsey, “ Natural Resource Policy in Montana,” in We the People  
o f Montana: The Workings o f  a  Popular Government, ed. J. Lopach (Missoula, Montana: 
Mountain Press, 1983).
12. Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West, A Vulnerable Land 
and Its Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
13. The following environmentalist organizations’ state legislative ratings were em­
ployed in this analysis: California League o f Conservation Voters, Colorado Open Space 
Council, Idaho Conservation League, Montana Environmental Information Center, and 
the Wyoming Outdoor Council.
14. See the following for findings on the relationship between party identification and 
environmentalist policy support: Frederick H. Buttel and William L. Flinn, “ The Politics 
of Environmental Concern: The Impact of Party Identification and Political Ideology on 
Environmental Attitudes,” Environmental Behavior 10 (1978): 17-36; Riley Dunlap and 
Richard Gale, “ Party Membership and Environmental Politics: A Legislative Roll Call 
Analysis,”  Social Science Q uarterly  55 (1974): 670-90; Henry C. Kenski and M. C. 
Kenski, “ Partisanship and Constituency Differences on Environmental Issues in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and Senate: 1973-1978,” in Environmental P olicy F orm ation, 
ed. Dean Mann (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981).
15. The membership figures for Sierra Club chapters are taken from official reports 
of the Sierra Club.
16. See F. Anderson, D. Mandelker, and A. Tarlock, Environmental Protection: Law
76 John G. Francis
and Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). Chapter 8 discusses environmental values and 
land use.
17. John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse 
(New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 13.
18. Theodore J. Lowi, The End o f Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of 
Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969).
19. Robert J. Nelson, The Making o f Federal Coal Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1983), pt. V.
20. William C. Dennis and Randy T. Simmons, “ From Illusion to Responsibility: 
Rethinking Regulation of Federal Land Policy,” in Kamieniecki, O’Brien and Clarke, 
Controversies, p. 69.
21. Thomas L. Gais, Mark Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, “ Interest Groups, Iron 
Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government,” British 
Journal o f Political Science ( 1984): p. 166-85. John M. Berry, The Interest Group Society 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).
